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Franzen: Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High School District 201, No. 788

Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High School District 201,
No. 78875, 1996 WL 19018 (ILL. JAN. 18, 1996).
INTRODUCTION

Donnell Palmer ("Palmer"), a student and star player on defendant's basketball team, and Suzanna Palmer, Donnell's mother, sued Mt. Vernon Township
High School District 201 ("the school district") for negligence, which allegedly
resulted in a serious eye injury to Palmer. The Illinois Circuit Court of Jefferson
County denied two jury instructions, recommended by Palmer, addressing the
affirmative duties owed to students by the school district. Instead, the circuit
court instructed the jury that the school district only had the duty to exercise
ordinary care in furnishing equipment to students to prevent serious injuries. The
circuit court then entered judgment on the jury verdict in favor of the school
district. The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District reversed the verdict
and remanded the case for a new trial. The appellate court found that the circuit
court had erred in failing to instruct the jury, as Palmer had requested, that the
school district had both the duty to warn students that they should furnish their
own protective equipment and the duty to allow them to use such equipment.
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court's decision and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.
FACTS
During a basketball tournament in December, 1985, Palmer was hit with an
elbow on the cheekbone, below his left eye, but was not seriously injured. At
that time Palmer began to have concerns that he might sustain a serious eye
injury while playing basketball. However, at no time had Palmer been warned by
anyone from Mt. Vernon Township High School that he should provide his own
eye-protection equipment, nor did Palmer ever inform anyone from the school
district that he felt he needed some form of eye-protection. Sometime in January,
1986, while shooting baskets before the day's practice, Palmer was approached
by a teammate carrying a pair of "Rec-Specs" eye goggles. The teammate allowed Palmer to wear the goggles as he shot baskets before practice. Coach Lee
Emery then came into the gymnasium, and upon seeing Palmer wearing the
goggles, told him not to wear them because someone else might get hurt. Coach
Emery testified at trial that he could not recall any basketball practice at which
Palmer wore protective eye gear. After that January practice, Palmer did not try
to wear eye goggles again, because he presumed that Coach Emery would not let
him. During practice on February 4, 1986, Palmer was poked in the left eye by
another player's finger. As a result of the injury, Palmer lost all vision in that
eye. Based on this injury, Palmer and his mother brought an action for negligence against the school district.
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At the conclusion of the trial, Palmer was allowed to set forth his three theories of negligence against the school district in a jury instruction. Palmer's jury
instruction number twenty-one claimed that the school district was negligent in
one or more of the following respects: (1) that the school district did not furnish
him with protective eye equipment, (2) that the school district did not warn him
that he should furnish his own protective eye equipment, and (3) that the school
district did not allow him to use protective eye equipment. Palmer also tendered
two jury instructions which the circuit court refused to give the jury. The two
instructions refused by the court were as follows:
Plaintiff's number 15: 'Where students are engaging in school activities, it is the
duty of the school district to exercise ordinary care to warn the students that
they should furnish their own equipment to prevent serious injuries.'
Plaintiff's number 16: 'Where students are engaging in school activities, it is the
duty of the school district to exercise ordinary care to allow the students to use
equipment to prevent serious injuries."
The circuit court refused to give the jury both instructions "for the reason that no
case in Illinois specifically set forth the rule of law stated by either instruction."2
Instead, the jury received plaintiff's instruction number fourteen, taken almost
verbatim from Lynch v. Board of Education of Collinsville Community Unit
DistrictNo. 10,' which stated: "where students are engaging in school activities,
it is the duty of the school district to exercise ordinary care to furnish equipment
to students to prevent serious injuries." 4 The jury then found for the school district, and the circuit court entered judgment on the jury verdict in favor of the
school district.
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District reversed the
verdict in favor of the school district and remanded the case for a new trial. The
appellate court reasoned that the jury instructions given by the circuit court failed
to adequately instruct the jury, as Palmer had requested, regarding the school
district's duty to warn students about wearing protective equipment, and its duty
to allow students to use protective equipment. The Supreme Court of Illinois
granted the school district's petition for leave to appeal.'
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The issue before the Supreme Court of Illinois was whether a school district
has either an affirmative duty to warn students that they should provide their
own safety equipment or an affirmative duty to allow students to use their own
safety equipment to prevent serious injury.' The supreme court began by point-

1. Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High Sch. Dist. 201, 647 N.E.2d 1043, 1047 (11. App. Ct.
1995)(emphasis added).
2. Id. at 1046.
3. 412 N.E.2d 447 (Il. 1980).
4. Palmer, 647 N.E.2d at 1047 (emphasis added).
5. Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High Sch. Dist. 201, 652 N.E.2d 344 (111. 1995) (granting
petition for leave to appeal).
6. Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High Sch. Dist. 201, No. 78875, 1996 WL 19018 (Ill.
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ing out that the appellate court had relied principally upon the Lynch7 and
Gerrity v. Beatty8 decisions. Following the reasoning of those cases, the appellate court found that the school district had both a duty to warn students that
they should provide their own safety equipment and a duty to allow students to
use their own safety equipment to prevent serious injury. The school district
argued "that Gerrity and Lynch set out the scope of a school district's duty to
provide adequate safety equipment for students' use during school athletic activities but did not impose upon a school district"' either of the "separate and distinct'"' duties found by the appellate court. In opposition, Palmer contended that
these duties "are logical corollaries to the duty to furnish safety equipment that
was established in Lynch and Gerrity."" The supreme court then briefly discussed both the Gerrity and Lynch cases.
In Gerrity, the plaintiff, a high school student, was seriously injured while
making a tackle in a high school football game, and alleged that the school district was negligent in furnishing a defective football helmet.' The school district claimed immunity under the School Code 3 for negligent acts of a teacher
undertaken during supervision or discipline of students. 4 The supreme court
rejected the school district's argument reasoning that "a school district cannot
vicariously claim immunity of a school teacher where it is alleged that the school
district's liability is premised upon the district's independent duty to provide
adequate safety equipment to the students."' 5 Therefore, as expressly recognized
by the Gerrity court, a school district has a duty to provide safety equipment
necessary to protect students from serious injury during school athletic activities. 6
In Lynch, the supreme court expanded the rule of Gerrity to include more
than just formally organized athletic activities. In that case, students engaged in a
football game on school property without the express authorization of the
school. 7 The school administration was aware that the game was planned but
did not provide safety equipment to those students participating." The supreme
court stated that the school district could be held liable for head injuries sustained by a student who was not wearing a helmet. 9 The Lynch court held that
"a school district has an affirmative duty, where students are engaging in school

Jan. 18, 1996).
7. 412 N.E.2d 447 (11. 1980).
8. 373 N.E.2d 1323 (11. 1978).
9. Palmer, 1996 WL 19018 at *3.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Gerrity, 373 N.E.2d at 1324.
13. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 122, para. 34-84a (1985) (105 ILCS 5/34-84a (West 1992)).
14. Gerrity, 373 N.E.2d at 1324.
15. Palmer, 1996 WL 19018 at *4 (citing Gerrity v. Beatty, 373 N.E.2d 1323 (111.1978)).
16. Id.
17. Lynch, 412 N.E.2d at 451.
18. Id. at 451-52.
19. Id. at 459.
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activities, whether they are extracurricular, or formally authorized as part of the
school program, to furnish equipment to prevent serious injuries. ' °
The supreme court then stated that Palmer's argument was in conflict with its
holdings in these two cases. Both Gerrity and Lynch impose an affirmative duty
to furnish equipment to prevent serious injuries." The supreme court found that
to impose upon the school district "[a] duty to warn students of the advisability
of wearing such equipment, and a duty to allow students to wear such equipment
if it is purchased at their own expense... " would allow the school district to
avoid its obligation to furnish appropriate safety equipment in the first place2
The court further noted that if a school district were allowed to advise its students that they should purchase safety equipment at their own expense, then only
students who could afford such equipment would be able to participate in school
athletic activities, and this result was clearly discouraged by the court in
Lynch?2 Therefore, the supreme court concluded that the school district's only
duty was to furnish Palmer with "the safety equipment that was reasonably necessary in order to protect [him] from reasonably foreseeable, serious bodily inju24
ry"

The supreme court then examined Palmer's second contention that he deserved a new trial "because his evidence demonstrated that he was 'denied his
right' to wear safety equipment while playing basketball." The supreme court
began by stating that Palmer's contention failed to distinguish between the duties
of a school district and those of its teachers. It was the supreme court's opinion
that "[a] school district has a duty to furnish safety equipment, while a teacher
has a separate and distinct duty to supervise the student's wearing or use of
safety equipment."26 In light of the distinct duties of a school district and teacher, the supreme court concluded that the decision as to whether Palmer could
wear the protective goggles was in the hands of the supervising teacher, Coach
Emery. The supreme court then pointed out that it is well settled "that teachers
stand in loco parentis to their students, and that their supervision of students'
activities is cloaked with immunity.. ." in the absence of willful or wanton misconduct by the supervising teacher. Palmer did not claim that Coach Emery's
denial of protective eye-wear constituted willful and wanton misconduct, nor was

20. Id.
21. Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High Sch. Dist. 201, No. 78875, 1996 WL 19018, *1 *5
(1l. Jan. 18, 1996).
22. Id.
23. Lynch v. Bd. of Educ. of Collinsville Community Unit Dist. No. 10, 412 N.E.2d 447, 460
(Ill.
1980).
24. Palmer, 1996 WL 19018 at *5.The jury found that the school district had not breached this
duty to furnish adequate safety equipment, and Palmer did not dispute this finding on appeal. Id.
25. Id. at *6.
26. Id. (citing Thomas v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 395 N.E.2d 538, 540-41 (Ill. 1979)).
27. See Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 347 N.E.2d 705 (111. 1976) (holding that an educator
should stand in the place of a parent or guardian in matters of discipline, and absent proof of willful
and wanton misconduct the teacher and school district could not be held liable on a negligence theory
for injuries sustained by students in physical education class).
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there anything in the record to support such a claim.' Therefore, the supreme
court held that Palmer was not entitled to recover from the school district for the
eye injury at issue in this case.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the decision of the appellate court and
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The supreme court held that a school
district has neither a duty to warn students that they should provide their own
safety equipment, nor a duty to allow students to use their own safety equipment
to prevent serious injury. The court reaffirmed, however, that a school district
does have "a duty to furnish reasonably necessary safety equipment to protect
'
students from reasonably foreseeable serious injury."29
Timothy G. Franzen

28. Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High School Dist. 201, 1996 WL 19018 at *6.
29. Id. at *5.
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